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Environmental law is altering the understanding and practice of 
law. Environmental Law is a legal discipline derived from social 
movements during the 1960s and 1970s, and has progressively received 
social, political, cultural, and legal acceptance. But its legitimacy is derived 
from extra-legal evidence. Law experienced a similar shift during the 
Progressive Era of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Progressive legal 
scholars promoted the Law and Society Movement, which focused on 
the concept of “legal realism.” Legal realism argued that courts consider 
legal and non-legal evidence in their decision-making processes. They 
preferred to base legal arguments on empirical research rather than 
traditional legal rules and institutions. In his 1881 work The Common Law, 
legal historian Oliver Wendell Holmes noted that experience should 
govern the creation and application of law, not solely logic. He argued 
that one had to be aware of all kinds of non-legal matters to develop a 
thorough understanding of law. In 1921, Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo’s 
work The Nature of the Judicial Process continued Holmes’s argument. He 
added that judges should not solely rely upon legal past precedent, but 
consider all branches of knowledge, experience, information, and their 
own intuition. Modern legal realists view law not as a fixed phenomenon, 
but in a state of constant flux, responding to changing social conditions.1 
Environmental law challenges court justices to not only include 
procedural law and sociological jurisprudence in their decisions, but also 
to consider each case as unique and different from all others. This 
concept of reflexive law is evident in the US Supreme Court Case Winter 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council (2008), where a 5-4 split Court opinion 
illustrates Cardozo’s arguments among the complex questions 
surrounding environmental law. Winter sheds light on the treatment of 
environmental legislation by the United States Government in the late 
20th and early 21st centuries and begs the question of whether the federal 
                                                            
1 Melvin I. Urofsky and Paul Finklemean, A March of Liberty: A Constitutional History of the 
United States, vol. 2, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 718-19. 
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government is the proper standard-bearer for and enforcer of 
environmental legislation. 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is the only 
major protective environmental legislation without a “national security” 
clause. In his work,  “NRDC v. Winter: Is NEPA Impending National 
Security Interests?” author C.C. Vassar, law clerk and graduate of 
Hamline University School of Law,  recommends the solution to the 
imbalance between national security and environmental protection is a 
national security amendment to NEPA.2 I disagree with Vassar’s 
proposition because a national security amendment would weaken the 
protectionist capabilities of NEPA. NEPA is protectionist legislation due 
to its preventative regulations, which are most effective when applied 
broadly. Further clarifications through amendment clauses, such as a 
national security clause, would compromise its broad application and 
therefore weaken its preventative directive. Preventative law is the only 
effective means of environmental protection against the onslaught of 
government agency action. Complying with NEPA regulations ensures 
that government agencies research and consider the impact of their 
actions upon the environment. The essential purpose of NEPA is to 
prevent the unknown and irreversible environmental impact of 
government actions.  
The “balance” between national security and environmental 
protection came to a head in the US Supreme Court case Winter v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council (2008). In Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council 
(2008), the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) sued for a 
preliminary injunction against Navy sonar training exercises scheduled 
for February 2007 and January 2009 of the coast of California. The 
plaintiffs argued that the Navy violated the National Environmental 
Policy Act because the Navy’s use of mid-frequency sonar irreversibly 
harmed marine life, the Navy should have completed a satisfactory 
Environmental Impact Statement before commencing the training 
exercises. In a 5-4 decision, the US Supreme Court held the Navy’s need 
to conduct realistic training exercises outweighed the plaintiffs’ 
“ecological, scientific, and recreational interests in marine mammals.”3 
                                                            
2 CC. Vassar, “NRDC v. Winter: Is NEPA Impending National Security Interests?” 
Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law 24, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 282. 
3 Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 07 US 1239 (2008). 
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Winter falls into the theme of “national security trumps all,” but the case 
is representative of many other legal and historical developments; the 
relationship between science and law, the expansion of executive 
authority, proving legal injury, defining “emergency circumstances,” and 
legal standardization.   
Vassar’s proposal is part of a popular legal strategy to standardize 
environmental law. An ongoing debate within law is whether to treat 
cases with standard formats or to treat each case as unique. 
Standardization favors procedural law, whilst uniqueness favors 
substantive law. Procedural law is the use of formulas based upon 
precedent. Essentially, similar cases are ruled in similar ways. Substantive 
law is the direct opposite; it is mandated by relativity. Each case is unique 
from all others and is treated for its substantive claims rather than 
precedent. A resulting question is whether there was a precedent case for 
Winter to conform to? The purpose of this work is to prove the answer is 
“no,” because multiple elements within Winter were new and 
underdeveloped scientifically, politically, and legally.  
Environmental law is a relatively young legal field, developing as 
a political force in the late 1960s. In his work, “Is There a There in 
Environmental Law?, ” Dan Tarlock, Distinguished Professor of Law 
and Director of the program in Environmental and Energy Law at 
Chicago-Kent College of Law, explains that environmental law largely 
depends upon the constant generation and application of new 
knowledge. Unlike other types of legal cases, environmental cases rarely 
conform to repetitive fact patterns. Therefore, Tarlock agrees with the 
theory of reflexive environmental law, which determines that 
environmental decisions be made based upon scientific knowledge and 
perspectives developed during the past four decades of environmental 
law. He states, “the best we can hope for are presumptions because, in 
the end, environmental law is a series of hypotheses that must be tested 
(and often modified) over a long time horizon by rigorous monitoring 
and experimentation.”4 Summarily, Tarlock argues that environmental 
law is derived from science and, therefore, depends upon science for 
legitimacy.  
                                                            
4 A. Dan Tarlock, “Is There a There in Environmental Law?” Journal of Land Use & 
Environmental Law 19, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 219-20. 
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The relationship between environmental law and science is not 
one-sided; it is a relationship of interdependence, with environmental law 
stimulating scientific research and technological experimentation. An 
example relevant to Winter is the work of the Office of Naval Research 
(ONR). Historically, the protection of gray whales fell under a web of 
protective legislation including the International Agreement for the 
Regulation of Whaling (1937), the Endangered Species Act (1973), and 
the Marine Mammal Protection Act (1972). ESA and MMPA were under 
the jurisdiction of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). EPA 
tasked the National Marine Fisheries Service (Fisheries) with regulation 
enforcement, as well as conducting investigations into unusual mortality 
events. But Fisheries lacked the funding for proper environmental 
investigations. Consequently, investigations were largely conducted by 
the Navy’s Office of Naval Research (ONR). Due to Fisheries’ 
dependence upon the Navy’s ONR, Fisheries did not generally fraternize 
with environmentalist organizations, such as the Natural Resources 
Defense Council.5 With the Navy as the primary source of funding and 
research for cetology, how quickly the discipline has and is developing is 
questionable. 
Winter highlights a lag between science and law because cetology, 
the study of whales, was vital to the case but was a massively 
underdeveloped discipline. An informative section of Joshua Horwitz’s 
work War of the Whales was the history of the Navy Sound Surveillance 
System, called SOSUS. SOSUS was born during the Cold War in an 
attempt to detect and destroy Soviet submarines. Surprisingly, cetology, 
the study of whales, and sonar research developed together. Horwitz 
describes the Navy’s attempt to train marine mammals to act as 
biological minesweepers during the 1970s in the Marine Mammal 
Training Program.6 The Navy was trying to tame and train marine life 
because of marine mammals’ use of biological sonar in deep waters. The 
program eventually failed and Sea World used its training techniques, but 
the program communicates the Navy’s utilization and objectification of 
                                                            
5 Kenneth M. Murchison, The Snail Darter Case: TVA versus the Endangered Species Act 
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2007), 69, 74, 81, 92. 
6 Joshua Horwitz, War of the Whales: A True Story (New York: Simon & Schuster 
Paperbacks, 2014), 50. 
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marine life and its growing interest in deep-sea acoustics, which became 
sonar.7  
Active sonar sends out pulses of sound that bounce off objects, 
which allows operators to assess the measure, size, and distance of 
marine objects. Operators must be proficiently trained due to the 
difficulty of distinguishing between natural marine noise and sonar. Mid-
Frequency Sonar has proven more successful than low-frequency sonar 
in helping operators distinguish between marine noise and sonar. 
Unfortunately, the higher frequency of Mid-Frequency Active (MFA) 
sonar has proven excruciating to marine mammals. In 1998, 
investigations linked the use of MFA sonar to mass beachings of whales 
and other marine life around the world. It was proven the noise could 
rupture the ears of and disorient marine life, including blue whales, 
dolphins, and beaked Curvier’s whales.8 Sonar also causes marine 
mammals to change their migration routes to avoid sonar noise because 
it interferes with their own biological sonar, echolocation. Echolocation 
helps marine mammals navigate, communicate, identify food sources, 
and locate possible threats. To avoid MFA sonar, marine mammals 
surface too quickly, which results in decompression sickness, known as 
“the bends.” Quick surfacing also creates gas bubbles in the blood 
stream, resulting in fatal hemorrhaging and lesions in the organs. These 
factors bring disorientation, causing marine mammals to stray from 
migration courses, leading to beaching, starvation, and mating and 
birthing disruptions.9  
The increase in occurrence and size of beachings during the 
1990s incurred concerns throughout the scientific community. It was not 
until the 1996 mass stranding in Greece that scientists considered the link 
between sonar and beachings. NATO naval forces had been conducting 
antisubmarine training exercises near the Hellenic Trench in the Ionian 
Sea. In 1999, approximately 1,500 marine mammals beached on US 
shorelines and only five survived. Darlene Ketten was the US Navy’s top 
whale pathologist and an expert for unusual mortality event 
investigations. She held joint appointments at Harvard Medical School 
and Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. Ketten was most concerned 
                                                            
7 Ibid., 232-35. 
8 Vassar, “NRDC v. Winter,” 281, 286-87. 
9 Ibid., 287-88. 
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about a beaching in the Bahamas in 2000 due to the magnitude, number 
of different species involved, and the extended geographical area across 
six islands. The beachings were connected to US Navy testing ranges 
throughout the Bahamas.10 
Ketten proved instrumental to sonar investigations because of 
her specialty in bioacoustics. Her research attests to the recent 
development of cetology as a discipline. She was the “first researcher to 
study the internal structures of beaked whale phonation and hearing, and 
the first to trace the path of sound waves all the way from their source in 
the ocean to the beaked whale’s auditory cortex.”11 She was also the first 
researcher to use CT scans to create a 3-D composite scans of whale 
heads. Computerized tomography (CT) was invented in 1980 and Ketten 
began her work during the 1980s. By 2000, Ketten was the go-to whale 
coroner and expert in the area of acoustic trauma and whale ear 
pathology. Horwitz described beachings as opportunities for 
advancements in cetology because of a chronic lack of whale specimens 
for research. Specimens were sought by zoologists, veterinarians, 
paleontologists, marine biologists, and toxicologists.12 Consequently, 
cetology was a young discipline that developed slowly for a lack of 
specimens as well as a lack of funding. 
The limited knowledge of cetology was evident in the oral 
argument of Navy General Gregory G. Garre before the Supreme Court 
in 2008 on behalf of the petitioners, the Navy. Justice Samuel Alito 
questioned whether “temporary” behavioral modifications caused by 
sonar could be considered injury: 
 
Justice Alito: In lay terms, what does that mean? 
Does it mean an alteration of their swimming pattern, 
their migration pattern? 
What does it mean? 
Mr. Garre: In most cases it means that there’s an alerting 
response, they hear the sound and they go in the opposite 
direction, as one who hears a noise that disturbs them 
would ordinarily do. 
                                                            
10 Horwitz, 18, 70-71, 110. 
11 Ibid., 103. 
12 Ibid., 104-106. 
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Justice Alito: It doesn’t necessarily mean that there’s a 
physical injury to them, does it? 
Mr. Garre: No. 
Justice Alito: It means that they may just swim in a 
different direction. 
Mr. Garre: That’s right.13 
 
And in Garre’s response he stated “the Navy acknowledged that there is 
uncertainty about the effects of sonar on beaked whales.”14 Justice John 
Stevens concurred with Justices Ginsburg and David Souter by stating:  
 
The very fact that you need an EIS [Environmental 
Impact Statement] is—is because you don’t know what 
environmental consequences may ensue. That’s the 
purpose of the EIS. So isn’t the normal practice to enjoin 
government action until the EIS is filed when it is clear 
there is a duty to file?15 
 
Ginsburg and Souter were concerned about the unknown environmental 
effects of government actions and NEPA was created to directly address 
these concerns. 
The National Environmental Policy Act was created in 1970 to 
provide a procedural framework federal agencies must work within to 
ensure policies of the act are implemented. NEPA requires government 
agencies to consider the adverse environmental impact of their actions 
and to allow public comment. Section 102 requires that federal agencies 
submit a report to Congress detailing the environmental impact of 
proposed actions. The report, referred to as the Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS), must describe the environmental impact of the 
proposed action, any adverse environmental effects that cannot be 
avoided, alternatives to the proposed action, and irreversible and 
irretrievable commitments of resources affected.16 For a satisfactory EIS, 
federal agencies also have to study, develop, and describe appropriate 
                                                            
13 “Oral Argument of Gregory G. Garre On Behalf of the Petitioners,” Winter v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, 555 US 07-1239 (2008). 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Public Law 91-190.   
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alternatives to the course of action for consideration. If agency action is 
taken before completion of the EIS, or the EIS is proven inadequate, 
injured parties may sue for preliminary injunctive relief.17 
Founded alongside NEPA in 1970, the Natural Resources 
Defense Council (NRDC) was a non-governmental organization 
composed of environmental lawyers and activists who filled a niche in 
the environmental community by helping draft and enforce 
environmental legislation. 18 Before the 1970s, environmental lawyers 
lacked an environmental legal arsenal, attempting to use common law 
principles for environmental protections. But the gambit of protective 
environmental legislation during the 1970s, gave environmental legal 
organizations, such as the NRDC, an “abundance of new statutory 
weapons.”19 The NRDC essentially became the regulator of regulatory 
agencies, especially the Environmental Protection Agency.20 
Preliminary injunctions are the most broadly and frequently used 
remedies employed by federal courts, but they lack clear application 
standards. A preliminary injunction is issued “to protect plaintiffs from 
irreparable injury and to preserve the court’s power to render a 
meaningful decision after a trial on the merits.” But the plaintiff is 
required to persuade the court of clear injury.21 Injunctions have proven 
vital to the legal regulation of federal agency actions with potential 
environmental impact. In Winter, the Natural Resources Defense Council 
sought an injunction, arguing the Navy violated NEPA by failing to 
prepare an adequate EIS prior to MFA sonar training exercises. The 
Navy responded that an EIS was unnecessary because the training 
exercises would not have had significant impact on the environment. The 
District Court found this contrary to the Navy’s own research proving 
sonar exercises would injure and disturb 37 species of marine life. 22 To 
circumnavigate NEPA’s EIS requirement, the Navy sought an emergency 
                                                            
17 Vassar, “NRDC v. Winter,” 284. 
18 Horwitz, 82. 
19 “Law and Policy. E-Law: What Started It All?” Natural Resources Defense Council, 
last modified May 5, 2000, accessed December 1, 2015, 
http://www.nrdc.org/legislation/helaw.asp. 
20 Horwitz, 82. 
21 Bethany M. Bates, “Reconciliation After Winter: The Standard for Preliminary 
Injunctions in Federal Courts,” Columbia Law Review 111 no. 7 (Nov. 2011): 1525-27. 
22 Vassar, “NRDC v. Winter,” 289-90. 
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circumstances exemption through the Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ). CEQ is a governmental agency created through NEPA to advise 
the executive branch of government, providing guidance and advice on 
environmental policy. In Winter, CEQ approved the Navy’s request and 
issued alternative arrangements in accordance with the emergency 
circumstances regulation and the Navy could continue its trainings. 
Courts generally defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulations, unless the agency’s interpretation opposes the original intent 
of the regulation. By overriding the NEPA EIS requirement, CEQ was 
clearly not acting in the interests of environmental protection. The 
district court noted NEPA has no national security defense exemption, 
therefore, regardless of CEQ interference; the Navy was still required to 
complete the EIS requirement of NEPA. The only way to bypass the EIS 
requirement is through direct legislation by Congress. CEQ could not 
bypass NEPA regulations “simply by characterizing an ordinary, planned 
activity as an emergency.” The court held CEQ’s action invalid and the 
Navy not exempted from either the EIS requirement or the preliminary 
injunction.23 
At the Supreme Court, Justices Ginsburg and Souter confirmed 
CEQ’s lack of statutory authority to override the EIS requirement of 
NEPA. Justice Roberts agreed that NEPA gives no body regulatory 
authority, neither EPA nor CEQ. He recognized CEQ as “ more or less 
an office in the White House, rather than a free-standing agency.”24 And 
Ginsburg stated the purpose of CEQ was “To set up an orderly regime 
for Federal agencies to carry out their obligations under NEPA.”25 In 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, in which Justice Souter joined, the Navy 
should have consulted Congress for legislative override of NEPA, not 
the executive branch.26  
After disproving the CEQ as an overriding authority of NEPA 
regulation, the Supreme Court addressed the case timeline. Justice Souter 
stated: 
 
                                                            
23 Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 07 US 1239 (2008). 
24 “Oral Argument of Gregory G. Garre On Behalf of the Petitioners.”  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ginsburg, J., dissenting, Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 US 07-1239 
(2008). 
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 I guess my question is, to the extent that there was an 
emergency, wasn’t the emergency created by the failure of 
the Navy to take any timely action? So it sounds to me as 
though that, if there is an emergency, it’s one that the 
Navy created simply by failing to start an EIS preparation 
in a timely way at which it trained in effect to sort of 
neutralize by keeping everybody in the dark until the last 
moment…there was no emergency here except one 
which was created by the Navy’s apparently deliberate 
inattention?27  
 
Aiming to create a narrow definition, the Court investigated what 
constituted an emergency. In Valley Citizens for a Safe Environment v. Vest 
(1991), a sudden change in hostility in a region of the world permitted 
Air Force use of sonar before completing an EIS. In contrast, the Navy 
in Winter experienced no such change in need for sonar training. Also, as 
described in the Garre’s argument, the Navy had plenty of notice to 
complete a satisfactory EIS. The District Court found “the Navy’s 
current emergency was simply a creature of its own making, i.e., its failure 
to prepare an adequate environmental documentation in a timely fashion, 
via the traditional EIS process or otherwise.”28 The Supreme Court’s 
reference to Valley Citizens for a Safe Environment v. Vest infers that what 
constitutes an emergency is the timing and level of threat.  
Stephen Holmes, Walter E. Meyer Professor of Law at New York 
University School of Law, presented the idea of a distinction between 
novel and urgent threats. Urgent threats require an immediate response 
and have precedents and protocols to follow. Novel threats lack a 
precedent and therefore lack a protocol to follow. But a novel threat is 
not considered an “emergency” like a sudden event requiring split-second 
decision-making. Urgent threats require quick reaction, with no 
opportunity for serious consultation and debate. Holmes argued that an 
enduring novel crisis, national-security personnel have time to think and 
rethink, plan ahead and revise their plans. The ultimate question is, “Is it 
                                                            
27 Ibid. 
28 Vassar, “NRDC v. Winter,” 292. 
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the kind of emergency that requires the government to rewrite radically, 
or flatly disregard, previously binding rules?”29 
Finding a middle ground between the Navy and NRDC has 
proven difficult, especially involving the use of sonar. MFA sonar has 
proven vital to detecting silent submarines, which threaten the safety of 
the US and its military.30 Vassar argued “the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals correctly determined that an emergency cannot refer to pre-
planned, long-term training exercises as part of a military policy that has 
no foreseeable end.”31 But, he stated, “ The intent behind the adoption of 
the emergency circumstances regulation only contemplates unexpected, 
unplanned circumstances that arise independent of agency action.”32 
Vassar’s proposal is logical; it would allow abrogation in emergency 
circumstances, such as those in Valley Citizens for a Safe Environment v. 
Vest, but would still prevent agency action abuses, such as in Winter.  
Vassar argues that NEPA currently enacted and administered 
does not adequately consider national security interests and that NEPA 
should be amended to include a national security exemption. The 
proposition is sensible and attempts to find a middle ground between 
environmental protections and government agency action. Vassar 
supports a national security exemption because it would legally address 
national security needs and “would provide clearer guidelines for which 
types of circumstances should be relieved from NEPA’s procedural 
requirements.”33 Vassar’s proposition clearly favors military interests over 
environmental interests, although he claims the amendment would strike 
a balance between the two. I am most cautious to support an emergency 
circumstance amendment to NEPA because of the legal history of the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA).  
Similar to NEPA, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) enacted 
broad-sweeping legal protections for endangered species and their 
habitats, initially with absolutely no exceptions. The Endangered Species 
Act (ESA) was enacted in 1973 to create legal, substantive protections for 
                                                            
29 Stephen Holmes, “In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on 
Terror,” California Law Review 97 no. 2 (April 2009): 309-11. 
30 Vassar, “NRDC v. Winter,” 281-82. 
31 Ibid., 282. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 303. 
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listed endangered species. Section 7 prohibits the taking of any listed 
endangered species and their habitat by any person or governmental 
agency.34 In TVA v. Hill (1978), in a 6-3 decision, the US Supreme Court 
approved an injunction against the Tennessee Valley Authority because 
completion of the Tellico Dam would have violated the Endangered 
Species Act by harming the endangered Snail Darter species and its 
habitat. The Court really had no choice because there were no avenues 
for exemptions from ESA prohibitions.35 Six months after TVA v. Hill, 
Congress amended ESA to create an Endangered Species Committee 
with authority to grant exemptions from section 7 prohibitions.36 TVA v. 
Hill was a victory for ESA, but also a loss with the creation of the 
Endangered Species Committee and the right of public interest in 
abrogating ESA. Enforcement of ESA has relied on administrative 
deference rather than the text of the law, de facto gutting the purpose of 
ESA; the protection of endangered species. This is due to the very broad 
reading of the Committee duties being, “the Committee shall grant 
exemption for any agency action is the Secretary of Defense finds that 
such exemption is necessary for reason of national security.”37 This broad 
reading does not specify what circumstances composes “reason of 
national security.” This same ambiguity is present in Winter, but, unlike 
ESA, there is no national security exemption within NEPA. 
NEPA regulations should be read narrowly with no exceptions. 
Winter was not about the Navy harming marine life; it was about the law 
and the Navy’s blatant disregard for it. The outcome of TVA v. Hill 
(1973) rendered the Endangered Species Act ineffective. But ESA and 
NEPA drastically differ on one crucial point; ESA is prohibitory 
legislation and NEPA is regulatory legislation. ESA strictly prohibits any 
action in violation of its mandates. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
demands strict protections for listed endangered species. Section 7 
prohibits the taking of any listed endangered species and their habitat by 
any person or governmental agency.38 But NEPA is merely part of the 
decision-making process and does not determine the decision outcome. 
                                                            
34 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Public Law 93-205. 
35 TVA v. Hill, 437 US 153 (1978); Murchison, The Snail Darter Case, 1-2.  
36 Ibid., 141, 153, 168-69. 
37 Vassar, “NRDC v. Winter,” 297. 
38 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Public Law 93-205. 
120
 
 
NEPA provides a step-by-step procedural framework federal agencies 
must work within to ensure policies of the act are implemented. NEPA 
technically does not prohibit government action, it merely requires 
compliance to its procedural regulations. 
Returning to TVA v. Hill, the reaction of Justice Powell was, “ 
The majority’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act established 
‘a continuing threat to the operation of every federal project, no matter 
how important to the Nation.’”39 Justice Powell viewed ESA as a threat 
to government action. NEPA was viewed with this same perspective in 
Winter. Assume hypothetically that the Navy had completed an adequate 
EIS and the level of irreversible environmental effects prohibited the 
sonar trainings altogether. The Supreme Court may still have overridden 
the decision for the preservation of national security. A change of 
perspective is needed for environmental law to succeed in its directives. 
NEPA should not be viewed as an enemy and rather be viewed as an ally 
to help agencies make better-informed decisions.  
The purpose of NEPA is to prevent irreparable environmental 
impact by federal agencies. Thirteen-thousand marine mammal injuries 
have been attributed globally to the US Navy’s use of sonar. 40 In Winter, 
it was difficult for the National Defenders of Wildlife to prove legal 
injury because cetology, the study of whales and marine life, was an 
underdeveloped discipline due to a lack of funding and specimens. 
Research toward cetology was left to the Office of Naval Research 
because the Environmental Protection Agency and Department of 
Fisheries and Wildlife lacked the funding. Obviously, the Navy was 
biased because it held a stake in the use of Mid-Frequency Sonar and its 
effect upon marine life. Beachings are a recent phenomenon, occurring 
primarily during the 1990s. So the rarity of specimens has slowed the 
development of cetology as well. As exemplified in Winter, we still do not 
understand the effects of sonar upon marine life. The issue of noise 
pollution and its effects on marine life is still being debated socially, 
politically, scientifically, and legally.  
The purpose of NEPA and its EIS regulation is to investigate the 
unknowns of government agency action, such as in TVA v. Hill and in 
                                                            
39 Ibid., 138-39 
40 Ibid., 351. 
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Winter.  Dan Tarlock argues that “environmental law is fated to be about 
process rather than predictable outcomes”41 because environmental 
protection is a process evolving along with the discovery of new 
information. A fear of the unknown effects of actions fuels scientific 
investigations, which better inform the decision making process. NEPA 
should contain absolutely no amendments and no exceptions should be 
permitted by any authority. The regulations set forth in NEPA are the 
most effective safeguards against federal environmental abuses, many of 
which are merely the result of a lack of information.  
William Rodgers, Stimson Bullitt Endowed Professor of 
Environmental Law at University of Washington School of Law, 
summarized the relationship between science and law by stating, 
“Without demeaning the many distinctions between the exercise of 
science and the practice of law, let me cut to the chase and declare that 
science is mostly about the ‘pursuit of truth’ and law is mostly about 
‘who wins.’”42 The most intriguing aspect of Winter was that the US 
Supreme Court actually granted the Navy’s request for exemption from 
NEPA. The Navy’s national security “emergency” was plainly the result 
of the Navy’s failure to complete a satisfactory EIS before its proposed 
trainings. Then the Navy attempted to override NEPA by consulting the 
CEQ for alternative arrangements. But the Court determined that only 
Congress could alter NEPA regulations, and that CEQ held no override 
authority. And yet, after the US Supreme Court dispensed with all the 
Navy’s arguments, the Court majority granted the Navy’s request. The 
opinion in Winter paints the Roberts Court (2006-present) as an activist 
court for national security interests because the Court usurped the 
authority of Congress by overriding NEPA, an authority it stated 
belonged only to Congress.  
In the February 2015 White House National Security Brief, 
Climate Change was identified as a national security emergency.43 This 
was a gain for environmental interests, but climate change is only one 
facet of environmental concerns. White House initiatives focus on 
                                                            
41 Tarlock, “Is There a There in Environmental Law?” 220.  
42 William H. Rodgers, Jr., “Giving Voice to Rachel Carson: Putting Science into 
Environmental Law,” Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law 28, no. 1 (Fall 2012): 61. 
43 The White House, President Barrack Obama, National Security Strategy (February 
2015), 12. 
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Climate Change, energy use, and environmental conservation.44 Climate 
Change has received the greatest political attention because it influences 
human environmental security. Environmental security is the concern 
about whether people have enough food, water, shelter, or necessary 
natural resources to live. Climate change threatens environmental security 
because it destabilizes these resources.45 Concerns over Climate Change, 
energy use, and conservation are all focused on human environmental 
use rather than human environmental abuse. None of these policies 
address environmental preservation, particularly the protection of animal 
species and their habitats. The primary preservationist White House 
initiative is the restoration of wetlands, including the Gulf of Mexico, 
California Bay Delta, Chesapeake Bay, Great Lakes, and the Everglades.46 
This initiative is promising, but Winter begs the question of how 
successfully environmental policies are being implemented and upheld 
within the inter-agency squabbles and developing interests of the United 
States government.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
44 “At a Glance,” The White House, President Barrack Obama, accessed April 13, 2016, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/energy.  
45 Sherri Goodman, “What is Environmental Security?” Yale Insights, last modified 
April 15, 2012, accessed March 20, 2016, http://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/what-
environmental-security.  
46 “Restoring Our Treasured Great Ecosystems,” the White House, President Barrack 
Obama, accessed 13, 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/our-environment.  
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